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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics 1 at Fordham University School of Law 2
examines the critical role of lawyers in building a
more just society, and explores how ethical values
inform and improve the legal profession. The Stein
Center supports a wide range of conferences,
publications, and independent research.
Additional amici curiae are professors,
practitioners, experts, and institutions in the field of
legal ethics and criminal defense. Amici believe that
competence is among the most foundational duties
that lawyers owe to their clients, critical to
safeguarding public trust in the legal profession and
criminal justice system. As such, amici have an
abiding interest in ensuring that courts honor the
standards of lawyer competency required by both the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Sixth
Amendment. As experts in the area of professional
responsibility, amici hope to assist the Court in
addressing the important issues presented by this
case.

Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the Rules of this Court, Petitioner
and Respondent have consented to the filing of this brief. This
brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for any
party, and no person or entity other than amici have made a
monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of
this brief.

1

The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of
Fordham University or the Fordham University School of Law.

2

2
Because of the large number of amici, the
names and brief descriptions of additional
individuals and institutions are attached as an
appendix.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Kentel Weaver demonstrated to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts that his criminal
trial was infected with structural error; however, the
court denied him relief because it misguidedly
applied harmless-error analysis. For three reasons,
amici believe that when ineffective assistance of
counsel results in structural error, defendants
should not be required to prove prejudice.
First, in failing to object to structural error, a
lawyer commits a serious breach of his fiduciary and
ethical duties. Allowing such incompetence to go
unremedied causes individual defendants real harm
and degrades trust in both the legal profession and
the criminal justice system as a whole.
Second, precedent urges a presumption of
prejudice when ineffective assistance of counsel
results in structural error. Like other lawyer errors
for which this Court already presumes prejudice,
structural errors contaminate the entire proceeding
and manifest a serious breakdown of the adversarial
process. Moreover, presuming prejudice is necessary
when the probability of harm to the defendant is
high, but the precise effects of the harm are difficult
to measure. Finally, a presumption of prejudice is
particularly appropriate because structural errors
should be obvious to the court and can be easily
prevented during trial.
Third, presuming prejudice will not result in
defense counsel purposefully failing to object to
structural defects in the hopes of winning a new
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trial. Intentionally failing to object to structural
error violates the Rules of Professional Conduct and
risks defense counsel’s professional and reputational
interests. Furthermore, the trial court and
prosecutors have both the ability and the duty to
prevent structural error, putting a nearly
insurmountable bar on defense counsel’s ability to
commit intentional mistakes. Significantly, there is
no empirical evidence supporting the concern that
defense counsel will intentionally create or ignore
structural errors.
Therefore, amici respectfully urge this Court
to presume prejudice in cases in which ineffective
assistance of counsel results in structural error.

5
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is beyond dispute that Kentel Weaver was
denied his constitutional right to a public trial.
During jury selection, the courtroom was fully closed
for two days, Pet. App. 39a, in clear violation of the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984); Presley v. Georgia,
558 U.S. 209, 213 (2010).
The unconstitutional denial of the public trial
right is classified as a “structural defect” because,
unlike trial errors, “structural defect[s] affect[] the
framework within which the trial proceeds.” Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). In cases
where defense counsel raises a timely objection,
structural errors are subject to automatic reversal.
Id. at 309-10. As this Court has observed, “structural
defects . . . defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’
standards,” because the precise effects of structural
error are difficult to discern. Id. at 309. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts accurately stated
this rule when it explained that “[w]here a
meritorious claim of structural error is timely raised,
the court presumes ‘prejudice, and reversal is
automatic.’” Pet. App. 39a (quoting Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 28 N.E.3d 437, 442 (Mass. 2015)).
But Mr. Weaver never received a new trial.
Instead, Mr. Weaver’s defense counsel failed to
object to the courtroom closure—a mistake that the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found to
be “the product of serious incompetency, inefficiency,
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or inattention to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial” and “not objectively
reasonable.” Pet. App. 40a (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, the court demanded that Mr.
Weaver demonstrate that his counsel’s mistake
caused him prejudice, Pet. App. 40a, and denied his
motion for a new trial because he could not do so,
Pet. App. 40a-41a.
In placing such a burden on Mr. Weaver,
Respondent has asked him to prove the impossible.
Not only must he show that his counsel was
incompetent (which he was), and that his counsel’s
incompetency resulted in structural error (which it
did), but Mr. Weaver must also show that this
structural error—which this Court said in
Fulminante “def[ies] analysis by ‘harmless-error’
standards”—was not, in fact, harmless. Fulminante,
499 U.S. at 310. Defense counsel did not close the
courtroom; the trial court did. But in practice, the
rule advocated by Respondent means that the denial
of Mr. Weaver’s constitutional right—in which the
defense lawyer, the prosecutor, and the trial judge
were equally complicit—cannot be remedied.
Mr. Weaver’s lawyer was incompetent, and
Mr. Weaver suffered structural error. His injustice
was twofold. But the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to grant him relief because,
in addition to suffering structural error, Mr. Weaver
was also denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Respondent’s rule would award less relief as the
injury grows. To avoid this perverse result, amici
urge this Court to grant Mr. Weaver the remedy he
would have received but for defense counsel’s
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incompetent and inexplicable failure to object: a new
trial.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT TOLERATE
DEFENSE
COUNSEL’S
GRIEVOUS
BREACH OF HIS FIDUCIARY AND
ETHICAL DUTIES.
A.

Mr. Weaver’s Defense Counsel
Breached
His
Duties
of
Competence and Diligence.

Lawyers owe their clients the fundamental
fiduciary duties of competence and diligence. These
obligations are foundational to the lawyer-client
relationship, and they are enshrined in the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers, and the Rules of
Professional Conduct of each of the fifty states. See
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n
2016) (“A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.”); Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”);
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 16 cmt. b (2000) (“A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .
Assurances of the lawyer’s competence, diligence,
and loyalty are therefore vital.”); see also infra note
4. These obligations extend to every client,
regardless of a client’s identity, claim, or ability to
pay. An indigent defendant deserves no less
diligence or competence than the wealthiest
corporate client. See ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard
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4-1.1(a) (4th ed. 2015) (defining “defense counsel,” to
whom the standards uniformly apply, as including
lawyers “privately retained, assigned by the court,
acting pro bono or serving indigent defendants in a
legal aid or public defender’s office”). Lawyers who
fail to provide competent representation to their
clients breach both their common law fiduciary
duties and their ethical obligations under the Rules
of Professional Conduct.
To achieve the minimum competency required
by their professional obligations, lawyers must
possess and exercise “the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.” Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.1. The fact that a lawyer has handled
similar matters in the past does not automatically
make his future representations competent.
Furthermore, a generally competent lawyer may,
due to a lapse of attention or understanding, perform
incompetently in one particular phase or element of
a case. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657
n.20 (1984) (“[T]he type of breakdown in the
adversarial process that implicates the Sixth
Amendment is not limited to counsel’s performance
as a whole—specific errors and omissions may be the
focus of a claim of ineffective assistance as well.”).
Unquestionably, Kentel Weaver did not
receive diligent and competent representation as
measured by “prevailing professional norms.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
During the empanelment of Mr. Weaver’s jury, court
officials closed the courtroom, Pet. App. 38a-39a, in
violation of Mr. Weaver’s clearly recognized Sixth
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Amendment right to a public trial, Pet. App. 39a40a. But Mr. Weaver’s defense counsel raised no
objection, Pet. App. 39a, because counsel incorrectly
believed that the Constitution would tolerate the
closure of a courtroom during voir dire, Pet. App.
49a-50a. As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts explained, Mr. Weaver’s lawyer
simply “did not understand that the public had a
right to be present during the jury empanelment
phase of the trial proceedings.” Pet. App. 40a.
Such a lapse is inexcusable. One of defense
counsel’s primary functions is to safeguard his
client’s constitutional rights, requiring counsel to
assiduously pursue avenues of procedural relief. As
the ABA Standards for the Defense Function
instruct, “Defense counsel should inform the client of
his or her rights in the criminal process at the
earliest opportunity, and timely plan and take
necessary actions to vindicate such rights within the
scope of the representation.” ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function,
Standard 4-3.7(a). Because Mr. Weaver’s defense
counsel so utterly failed in these duties, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts accurately observed
that “counsel’s inaction was the product of ‘serious
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention to the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial,
and was not objectively reasonable.’” Pet. App. 40a.
Ignorance is no excuse. To maintain minimal
competence, defense counsel must possess or acquire
the knowledge necessary to mount an adequate
defense, especially when constitutional rights are at
issue. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
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Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 4-3.7(g)
(“Whenever defense counsel is confronted with
specialized . . . legal issues with which counsel is
unfamiliar, counsel should, in addition to
researching and learning about the issue personally,
consider engaging or consulting with an expert.”).
Counsel’s
unawareness
of
Mr.
Weaver’s
constitutional rights and counsel’s resultant failure
to object to the closure of the courtroom fall far short
of the competence “reasonably necessary for the
representation.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.1;
see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (holding that the
defendant “must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”).
B.

Allowing
Gross
Lawyer
Incompetence To Go Unremedied
Degrades Trust in the Legal
Profession
and
the
Criminal
Justice System.

Because of his defense counsel’s ignorance,
Kentel Weaver is now serving a life sentence for a
conviction tainted by structural error. But while the
interests of justice prescribe relief for Mr. Weaver,
the importance of remedying ineffective assistance of
counsel goes beyond safeguarding individual
defendants’ rights. This case is about more than
correcting one error; it is about preventing the
degradation of the adversarial process. The courts’
role in enforcing lawyers’ duties of competence and
diligence is essential to the health of the criminal
justice system and the independence of the legal
profession.
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A lawyer’s duties of competence and diligence
are bedrock principles of the legal profession. Our
legal system could not function—or, at least,
function justly—any other way. An individual
without legal training often cannot competently
navigate the justice system alone; instead, he relies
on a lawyer to make the justice system intelligible
and accessible. See Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 16 cmt. b (“[A]dequate
representation is often essential to secure persons
their legal rights. Persons are often unable either to
know or to secure their rights without a lawyer’s
help.”). A client places absolute trust in his lawyer—
trust that the lawyer will safeguard the client’s most
sensitive information, trust that the lawyer
possesses the requisite legal knowledge and skill,
and trust that the lawyer will zealously pursue his
client’s interests.
It is vital that the legal profession earn and
steward this trust. Individual clients often cannot
monitor their lawyers’ performance, because “[a]
lawyer’s work is sometimes complex and technical,
often is performed in the client’s absence, and often
cannot properly be evaluated simply by observing
the results.” Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers § 16 cmt. b. Instead, the legal
profession as a whole has made a promise to the
public: In exchange for the privilege of selfgovernance, lawyers and judges take responsibility
for establishing, following, and enforcing rules of
conduct that fulfill lawyers’ special fiduciary
obligations. As the Preamble to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct explains, “The legal
profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special
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responsibilities of self-government. . . . Neglect of
these responsibilities compromises the independence
of the profession and the public interest which it
serves.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. cmt. 12.
In particular, public trust in the integrity of
the criminal justice system relies on competent
defense counsel. This is why the constitutional
guarantee of “the assistance of counsel,” U.S. Const.
amend. VI, requires more than the mere presence of
“a person who happens to be a lawyer,” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 685; see also McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.”). For the
adversarial system to work, defense counsel must
provide a reliable counterweight to the prosecution.
As this Court stated in Cronic, “The right to the
effective assistance of counsel is . . . the right of the
accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. . . .
[I]f the process loses its character as a confrontation
between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is
violated.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57. Only “access to
counsel’s skill and knowledge” can guarantee
defendants have “the ‘ample opportunity to meet the
case of the prosecution’ to which they are entitled.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (quoting Adams v. U.S.
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)).
While in principle the Sixth Amendment
guarantees effective assistance of counsel, it is the
legal community that gives content to this right in
practice. As this Court has recognized, “The Sixth
Amendment refers simply to ‘counsel,’ not specifying
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particular requirements of effective assistance. It
relies instead on the legal profession’s maintenance
of standards sufficient to justify the law’s
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the
adversary process that the Amendment envisions.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Strickland ’s presumption of competency is
jeopardized
when
courts
permit
ineffective
assistance of counsel to result in structural error.
Defense counsel must make myriad strategic
decisions during the course of their representations,
and defendants unacquainted with criminal law and
trial tactics must, in the usual case, trust their
lawyers to make competent decisions. But the public
loses confidence that defense counsel are not
committing difficult-to-monitor trial errors when
courts fail to redress easily detectible structural
errors. The fiduciary promise of the legal profession
falls under suspicion when self-regulation so openly
and notoriously fails to safeguard defendants’
fundamental constitutional rights. Because it is
imperative that no court tolerate grave lawyer
incompetence that results in structural error, amici
urge this Court to announce a rule that gives real
effect to the fiduciary promise made by lawyers to
their clients.
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III.

THE SAME LOGIC THAT PRECLUDES
HARMLESS-ERROR
ANALYSIS
IN
OTHER
CONTEXTS
COMPELS
PRESUMING
PREJUDICE
WHEN
INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE
OF
COUNSEL RESULTS IN STRUCTURAL
ERROR.

In keeping with precedent and the judiciary’s
central role in regulating the legal profession, this
Court should presume prejudice when ineffective
assistance of counsel results in structural error. The
Court traditionally presumes prejudice for three
reasons. First, counsel’s error contaminates the trial
and manifests a “breakdown in the adversarial
process.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. Second, the
probability that the error resulted in harm to the
defendant is high, but the precise effects of the harm
are difficult to measure. See, e.g., id. at 658;
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 488-91 (1978). Third, the trial judge
can easily observe, prevent, and remedy the error.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Taken together,
these reasons reflect an understanding that public
trust is essential to the proper functioning of our
legal system and that judges have a substantial role
to play in promoting that trust.
A.

The Error Infects the Trial and
Manifests a “Breakdown in the
Adversarial Process.”

This Court has frequently presumed prejudice
in situations in which counsel’s error so
contaminated the proceeding that it resulted in a

15
complete “breakdown in the adversarial process.”
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. Whenever a defendant is
saddled with counsel who is “[un]able to invoke the
procedural and substantive safeguards that
distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of
injustice infects the trial itself.” Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980). To determine whether this
risk has manifested, Strickland ordinarily imposes a
prejudice requirement. The purpose of this
requirement is to discern “whether counsel’s conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686. However, in certain circumstances,
defense counsel’s conduct so dramatically exhibits
this risk of injustice and consequent breakdown of
the adversarial process that any additional showing
of prejudice should be unnecessary. This is the case
when ineffective assistance of counsel results in
structural error.
Two situations in which the Court already
presumes prejudice demonstrate this point. First,
this Court presumes prejudice when “counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at
659. In Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966),
defense counsel failed to communicate to the
defendant that by his agreeing to a prima facie trial,
he was waiving his right to cross-examination. The
Court concluded that the “denial of crossexamination without waiver . . . [was] constitutional
error of the first magnitude and no amount of
showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Id. at 3
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(emphasis added) (quoting Brief for Respondent at
33).
Second, this Court presumes prejudice when a
concurrent conflict of interest “actually affect[s] the
adequacy of [a defendant’s] representation.” See
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349. Because conflicts of interest
persist throughout the trial and impair counsel’s
performance at every stage, the Court has not
required defendants to show prejudice. Instead, the
Court has assumed that such conflicts automatically
undermine the trial’s fairness. See id. at 349 (“The
conflict itself demonstrate[s] a denial of the right to
have the effective assistance of counsel.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 378 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that when defense counsel “labors under
a conflict of interest that affects her performance,
then [the Court] assume[s] a breakdown in the
adversarial process that renders the resulting
verdict unreliable”).
Ineffective assistance of counsel that results
in structural error demonstrates a similar
contamination of the trial and consequent
breakdown of the adversarial process. Structural
errors are defects within the “framework” of the trial
itself; when they are present, “a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence.” Fulminante,
499 U.S. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
577-78 (1986)). Like the denial of the right to crossexamination, structural errors fundamentally
undermine the adversarial process by depriving the
defendant of essential structural protections.

17
Moreover, much like conflicts of interest, structural
errors persist throughout the trial and “infect the
entire trial process.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 630 (1993). This is especially true where the
error involves the closure of the courtroom for voir
dire. The knowledge that the jury was selected in an
unconstitutional manner casts serious doubt upon
defendant’s conviction.
For these reasons, this Court has abandoned
harmless-error analysis for structural defects. So
long as defense counsel timely objects to the error,
prejudice is presumed. Respondent, however, asks
this Court to create a special rule for unpreserved
structural errors, exempting them from the normal
presumption. But to do so would be drawing a
distinction without a difference. In both cases, the
breakdown in the adversarial system is the same.
The fact that trial counsel failed to object to the
constitutional infirmity when it first occurred
changes nothing.
To impose a heightened burden on individuals
with ineffective counsel would be contrary to
precedent. Just as importantly, such an imposition
would undermine the notion that the legal profession
and the courts together establish and enforce
standards of conduct to maintain public trust. That
trust is based on the belief that criminal status is
determined through a fair and uniform process
rather than procedural Russian Roulette; a client
should not be denied essential structural protections
merely because she happens to receive or retain a
grossly incompetent lawyer.
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Lawyers and judges have a duty to “further
the public’s understanding of and confidence in the
rule of law and the justice system.” Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct pmbl. cmt. 6. By presuming prejudice
in situations in which defense counsel’s error results
in a breakdown of the adversarial process, the Court
recognizes and affirms this responsibility. Because
“legal institutions . . . depend on popular
participation and support to maintain their
authority,” id., it is imperative that the Court
safeguard
a
trial’s
fundamental
structural
protections. No structural protection is more
important to the legitimacy of the judicial process
than the right to a public trial. In an open trial,
“[t]he public may see [that the defendant] is fairly
dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and . . . may
keep [the defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense
of their responsibility and to the importance of their
functions . . . .” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (quoting
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380
(1979)). Defendants should not need to prove the
harm caused by the loss of this right; it is inherent
and obvious.
B.

Even Though the Precise Harms
Are Difficult To Measure, the
Probability of Prejudice Is High
When the Error Continues To
Infect the Proceeding.

The Court has also long recognized the
improvidence of requiring defendants to show
prejudice in situations where harm is likely albeit
difficult
to
prove.
Strickland ’s
prejudice
requirement finds its roots in the principle that the
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defendant should receive relief when “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. However, in cases in which mistakes of counsel
result in structural error, the probability of harm to
the defendant is both extreme and incalculable.
When the Court has encountered this problem in
alternative settings, it has traditionally presumed
prejudice for two reasons.
First, certain errors “are so likely to prejudice
the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a
particular case is unjustified.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at
658 (collecting cases). For example, where a
defendant has been denied counsel or the State has
impermissibly interfered with the provision of
counsel, the Court has consistently presumed
prejudice on the grounds that the “likelihood that
the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-bycase inquiry is unnecessary.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535
U.S. 162, 166 (2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692
(“Prejudice [when counsel is denied or the state
interferes with counsel’s assistance] is so likely that
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the
cost.”).
Second, presuming prejudice is appropriate
when an error persists throughout the trial and the
particular harms caused by the error are difficult to
measure. Determining the amount of prejudice
requires courts to establish a baseline in the
counterfactual world of adequate assistance. But
such analysis is impossible when the defect stems
not from some discrete, identifiable error but rather
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from the mechanism of the trial itself. The Court
presumes prejudice in actual conflict of interest
cases for this very reason, explaining that “it is
difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense
of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. Indeed, the attempt to
calculate prejudice in such situations would
necessarily require groundless speculation about
unpredictable chains of events. For this reason, “a
rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of
interests . . . prejudiced him in some specific fashion
would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded
application. . . . [T]o assess the impact . . . would be
virtually impossible.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91;
see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1942) (“To determine the precise degree of prejudice
. . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial.”).
When ineffective assistance of counsel results
in structural error, the same concerns of probable
prejudice and improbable proof are present. Harm to
the defendant is highly likely, if not inevitable.
Furthermore, such harm is difficult, if not
impossible, to calculate. Structural errors call into
question the entire “framework within which the
trial proceeds.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. Indeed,
as this Court has already recognized, once the
Constitution’s “basic protections”—including the
right to a public trial—have been violated, “no
criminal punishment may be regarded as
fundamentally fair.” Id. (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at
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577-78). Thus, once a structural error has occurred,
the defendant is—by definition—prejudiced.
There is a corresponding parallel between the
difficulty of measuring the effects of conflicted
counsel and structural error. Unlike ordinary trial
errors whose “scope is readily identifiable,”
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, the harms of enduring
structural error and conflicted counsel are not
discrete. In the case of conflicted counsel, the error
endures throughout the trial and the harms are
based less on what counsel has done and more on
what counsel has “refrain[ed] from doing.” Id. at 475
(emphasis omitted). Thus, an investigation into
prejudice
necessarily
involves
counterfactual
inquiries and “unguided speculation.” Id. at 491.
Similarly, whereas the harm caused by a trial
error may be “quantitatively assessed,” structural
errors “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards.”
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308-09. “Harmless-error
analysis in such a context would be a speculative
inquiry into what might have occurred in an
alternate universe.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). The closing of the
courtroom, particularly during the critically
sensitive process of voir dire, could have longreaching and unpredictable effects on the trial. In a
public setting, different issues may have been raised;
prospective jurors may have been asked different
questions; perhaps even the resulting jury panel
itself would have been different. If such possibilities
sound speculative, it is because they are. But that is
precisely the point. To evaluate the effects of
counsel’s failure to object to the closure of the
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courtroom during voir dire is to engage in “unguided
speculation.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491. If prejudice
is not presumed in this situation, no defendant who
raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
based on structural error will be able to succeed.
This Catch-22 should have no place in ineffective
assistance of counsel jurisprudence.
Respondent would bar Mr. Weaver from relief
precisely because his counsel’s error was so
insidious. Under Respondent’s rule, counsel’s trial
errors can be remedied upon a showing of prejudice.
Counsel’s structural errors, on the other hand, are
functionally permanent, since prejudice is so difficult
to prove. Because this Court has held that structural
errors generally require automatic reversal while
trial errors do not, this paradoxical standard is
inappropriate and unjust.
In addition to breeding injustice at the
individual level, Respondent’s standard would
degrade the integrity of the legal profession and
decrease public trust in the system as a whole. If
defendants’ receipt of full structural protections were
made to depend on their ability to retain effective
counsel, the criminal justice system would appear
arbitrary and poorly regulated. After all, criminal
defendants are rarely in a position to know, let alone
protect, their own rights; they must rely on their
lawyers’ knowledge and expertise in this area. In
order for the legal system to function in a manner
worthy of public confidence, important structural
protections, such as the right to a public trial, cannot
be made to depend on a lawyer’s skill or diligence.
The system loses its legitimacy if such protections
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rest on the luck of the draw with respect to counsel’s
competence. As the regulators of our own profession,
lawyers and judges have the obligation to maintain
professional standards that encourage confidence in
the system.
C.

The Trial Court Can Easily Police
the Error.

In the usual case of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the trial judge has few realistic
opportunities to avert defense counsel’s mistakes.
The judge may be unaware of counsel’s lapse, for
example, when the question is whether counsel
conducted an adequate investigation. Alternatively,
the judge may perceive a potential lapse, but be
unable to inquire into whether that “lapse” was
strategic because such an investigation would invade
the lawyer-client relationship. Structural errors,
however, are different. The primary duty for
preventing structural errors rests with the court.
Moreover, structural errors are easy to observe and
police. In circumstances such as these, where the
trial court has both the ability and the responsibility
to prevent error, this Court has traditionally
presumed prejudice.
For example, this Court has presumed
prejudice where the right of counsel was denied or
interfered with on the grounds that “such
circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth
Amendment right that are easy to identify and . . .
easy for the government to prevent.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 692. The Court has reasoned similarly in
concurrent conflicts of interest cases: “Given the
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obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and
the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in
certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it is
reasonable for the criminal justice system to
maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed
prejudice . . . .” Id. at 692 (internal citation omitted).
As with the denial of counsel and concurrent
conflicts of interest, structural errors cannot occur
without the awareness and acquiescence of several
parties.
Judges
are
well-equipped
and
constitutionally obligated to guard against structural
errors. All structural errors are observable and
involve at least the tacit participation of the judge. 3
Moreover, because structural errors are defects in
the framework of the trial itself, the prosecutor
should also be expected to recognize and address
these errors.
Mr. Weaver’s case presents one of the rare
circumstances in which the principal responsibility
for preventing error lies not with defense counsel,
but with the trial court. A public official, acting
under the judge’s supervision, closed the courtroom
The complete list of structural errors recognized in
Fulminante includes the “deprivation of the right to counsel . . .
the right to self-representation at trial . . . and the right to
public trial;” the “unlawful exclusion of members of the
defendant’s race from a grand jury;” and trial by a “judge who
is not impartial.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10. Since
Fulminante, the Court has added two additional structural
errors to the list: denial of the “right to counsel of choice,”
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146, and denial of the “right to a
jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). None of these errors can
occur without the court’s knowledge and assent.
3
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during voir dire. While a competent lawyer could
have—and would have—objected to this closure, Mr.
Weaver should not be penalized for his counsel’s
shortcomings. Where the judge, the prosecutor, and
the defense counsel all failed to recognize and
prevent clear structural error, there has been a
grievous failure of the legal system’s self-regulation.
“No amount of showing of want of prejudice would
cure” this triple failure. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 3
(quoting Brief for Respondent at 33). The fact that
the judicial system failed to protect Mr. Weaver in
the first instance cannot justify his continued
suffering on appeal. In keeping with this Court’s
precedent and the judiciary’s historic role in
promoting a legal system that engenders public
trust, amici urge this Court to presume prejudice in
Mr. Weaver’s case.
IV.

APPLYING
A
PRESUMPTION
OF
PREJUDICE
WILL
NOT
CAUSE
DEFENSE
COUNSEL
TO
MAKE
INTENTIONAL MISTAKES.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
expressed concern that if unpreserved structural
error could be used as a means to win a new trial,
counsel would “harbor error as an appellate
parachute.” Commonwealth v. LaChance, 17 N.E.3d
1101, 1107 (Mass. 2014) (quoting People v. Vaughn,
821 N.W.2d 288, 308 (Mich. 2012)). This fear is
unfounded. Presuming prejudice will not encourage
defense counsel to intentionally create structural
errors. First, creating an “appellate parachute”
would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Second, the trial court can easily prevent structural
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error, meaning that lawyers cannot intentionally
provide ineffective assistance without the court’s
acquiescence. Finally, there is no evidence
demonstrating the widespread use of this “appellate
parachute.”
A.

Purposeful Failure To Object to
Structural Error Violates the Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
and
Directly Conflicts with Defense
Counsel’s Interests.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
create several duties that counsel would violate by
intentionally allowing their clients to suffer
structural error. Rules in every state and federal
district court would prohibit such intentional
ineffective assistance of counsel. 4

4 A version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct has been
adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. See
Am. Bar Ass’n, State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional
Conduct,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profess
ional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html.
Although not based on the Model Rules, the California Rules of
Professional
Conduct
specially
prohibit
intentional
incompetence. See Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3-110 (2015)
(“A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly
fail to perform legal services with competence. . . . For purposes
of this rule, ‘competence’ in any legal service shall mean to
apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental,
emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the
performance of such service.”). Through the adoption of local
rules, federal district courts generally apply the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the state where they sit.
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First, purposefully allowing structural defects
would violate defense counsel’s obligations of
competence and diligence. See Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.3. In order to act with the required “zeal
in advocacy upon the client’s behalf,” lawyers must
object to any structural error at trial. Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s
behalf.”). As Judge Duffly’s dissent in LaChance
observed, “I do not accept the court’s assumption
that a defendant’s trial counsel, who was aware of
the removal of the defendant’s family members from
the court room, would engage in conduct that fails to
respect the duty of zealous representation owed to a
client.” LaChance, 17 N.E.3d at 1112 (Duffly, J.,
dissenting).
It is no response to argue that counsel
complies with the mandate of zealous advocacy when
he surreptitiously creates “appellate parachutes” for
his clients. Such a tactic would still violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct. If counsel fails to object to
structural error for tactical reasons without
consulting with his client, counsel would be usurping
a decision that rightfully belongs to his client.
According to Model Rule 1.2, lawyers must respect
their clients’ “decisions concerning the objectives of
representation” and must “consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued.”
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.2. Furthermore, to
enable clients to make important decisions about
their representation, lawyers have an affirmative
obligation to clearly and consistently communicate
with their clients. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r.
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1.4 (“A lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client’s
objectives are to be accomplished . . . [and] explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”). Certainly, the waiver of the
constitutional right to a public trial—the deprivation
of which constitutes reversible structural error—
would require communication with and approval by
the client. By contrast, if the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waives the constitutional right at
issue, he cannot later seek a new trial based on
either a claim of structural error or ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Second, such conduct would violate a lawyer’s
duties to the court. Withholding an objection to
create an “appellate parachute” would “abuse legal
procedure[s],” a tactic prohibited by the Model Rules.
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (“The
advocate has . . . a duty not to abuse legal procedure.
The law, both procedural and substantive,
establishes the limits within which an advocate may
proceed.”). In particular, Model Rule 3.3 requires
“Candor Toward the Tribunal.” Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 3.3. “This Rule sets forth the special
duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid
conduct that undermines the integrity of the
adjudicative process.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
r. 3.3 cmt. 2. Purposefully harboring structural error
would violate this rule. Similarly, Model Rule 8.4
declares that “it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice.” Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 8.4; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
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pmbl. cmt. 5 (“A lawyer should use the law’s
procedures only for legitimate purposes . . . .”).
A lawyer who willfully permits structural
error to permeate a trial would subject himself to
discipline, which could include formal reprimand,
prohibition against taking on future criminal
representations, or disbarment. See Model Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4 cmt. 1. Lawyers in federal court
can also be financially penalized for purposefully
creating unnecessary appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(2012) (“Any attorney . . . [who] so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”).
Courts have broad powers to impose discipline on
lawyers appearing before them. See In re Snyder,
472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (“Courts have long
recognized an inherent authority to suspend or
disbar lawyers. . . . This inherent power derives from
the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court which
granted admission.” (internal citations omitted)).
Additionally, judges who witness or learn about
serious breaches of the Rules of Professional
Conduct must refer the offending lawyers to the
appropriate disciplinary body. See Model Code of
Judicial Conduct r. 2.15 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010).
In addition to risking formal sanctions,
lawyers who provide constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel face high reputational costs. As
this Court has recognized, “[I]t is virtually
inconceivable that an attorney would deliberately
invite the judgment that his performance was
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constitutionally deficient in order to win federal
collateral review for his client.” Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986).
In fact, far greater than the theoretical risk
that lawyers will intentionally tarnish their
reputations for the sake of their clients is the
observed risk that lawyers will turn against their
clients in an attempt to save their reputations.
Defense lawyers often vigorously fight against their
former clients’ ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. For example, in Purkey v. United States, “[i]n
response to [ineffective assistance of counsel]
allegations,” defense counsel “filed a 117 page
affidavit, in which he [went] into extensive detail to
refute movant’s claims.” Purkey v. United States, No.
01-00308-01-CR-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d, 729 F.3d 860 (8th
Cir. 2013). Similarly, in Binney v. State, the former
defense counsel gave the Attorney General’s Office
“petitioner’s entire trial file” because he deemed the
information “necessary for the defense of his
representation.” Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 481
(S.C. 2009). Notably, the lengths to which some
lawyers have gone to defend against ineffective
assistance of counsel claims recently prompted the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics to issue a formal
opinion on the subject. See ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010)
(addressing the question of “whether a criminal
defense lawyer whose former client claims that the
lawyer
provided
constitutionally
ineffective
assistance of counsel may . . . disclose confidential
information to government lawyers . . . to help the
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prosecution
establish
that
representation was competent”).

the

lawyer’s

Thus, the purposeful creation of structural
error runs directly contrary to the self-interest of
defense lawyers. Because of the strong professional
disincentives facing defense counsel, forcing
defendants to demonstrate prejudice on appeal adds
a procedural bar solely to combat a non-existent
problem.
B.

Because Judges and Prosecutors
Have the Ability and Responsibility
To Prevent Structural Defects,
Defense
Counsel
Cannot
Unilaterally Create Such Errors.

Structural errors can occur only through the
court’s tacit participation. Unlike trial errors—
whose unconstitutionality may only be apparent
with knowledge of facts outside the courtroom—
structural errors occur in the presence of the court.
Crucially, this means that defense counsel cannot
indiscriminately create “appellate parachutes”
through structural error; the court has the ultimate
power to prevent such defects from undermining the
integrity of the trial mechanism.
In fact, it is the judge’s affirmative duty to
prevent such structural errors. Judges have a
responsibility to prevent the deprivation of rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Special Functions of
the Trial Judge, Standard 6-1.1(a) (3d ed. 2000)
(“The trial judge has the responsibility for
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safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the
interests of the public in the administration of
criminal justice.”). Judges also must ensure that all
officers of the court endeavor to preserve the
defendant’s rights. The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that “[a] judge shall require court
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s
direction and control to act in a manner consistent
with the judge’s obligations under this Code.” Model
Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.15.
This duty extends to prosecutors as well. The
Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear that
prosecutors also have an obligation to prevent
structural errors from occurring. “A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate.” Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 3.8 cmt. 1. As a minister of justice, the
prosecutor owes the defendant—and the criminal
justice system writ large—the “obligation[] to see
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.”
Id.
Thus, an “appellate parachute” cannot result
from defense counsel’s malfeasance unless the judge
and prosecutor are also derelict in their professional
duties. 5 Because intentional structural errors only
result from the simultaneous wrongdoing of defense
counsel, judges, and prosecutors, they should not be
Recent cases where this Court has addressed intentional
defense counsel mistakes do not involve structural error, so
they are distinguishable from the case at bar. See, e.g., Puckett
v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133 (2009) (distinguishing
failure to object to the violation of a plea agreement from cases
involving structural error).
5
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a serious concern. Trial courts, in effect, set the
outer limit on the number of structural errors that
defense counsel can make.
C.

There Is No Evidence To Support
the Conjecture that Lawyers Would
Intentionally Harbor Error.

Defense
counsels’
use
of
“appellate
parachutes” has not, and will never, run rampant.
Under longstanding precedent, courts must inquire
whether a lawyer’s purported mistake instead
resulted from a strategic decision. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 (explaining that judges must give
counsel “wide latitude . . . in making tactical
decisions”). If a court determines that a lawyer
intentionally failed to object to structural error, the
defendant cannot make an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Furthermore, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct would require a lawyer to be
honest if questioned about whether his ineffective
assistance of counsel was tactical. Model Rules
of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact . . . to a
tribunal.”). Having to admit that his deficient
representation was tactical would prevent any gain
from using such a strategy in the first place.
Accordingly, the potential benefit of a tactical
mistake to the defendant is nil, while the potential
cost to the defendant’s lawyer is extremely high.
Thus, as Justice Brennan observed, the fear of
intentional error “is without basis” because “no
rational lawyer would risk the ‘sandbagging’ feared
by the Court.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
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102-03 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed,
Justice Brennan noted that “the Court points to no
cases or commentary arising during the past 15
years” that support such a concern. Id. at 102. Amici
are aware of no empirical studies controverting
Justice Brennan’s claim that have emerged in the
intervening decades. In fact, four circuit courts and
two state courts 6 have adopted a presumption of
prejudice when ineffective assistance results in
structural error with no apparent deleterious effects.
The “appellate parachute” is not a common
occurrence, but in the few cases where it is unclear
whether such a tactic has been used, granting
defendants a new trial is far better than the
alternative. However this Court decides to treat
structural defects resulting from ineffective
assistance of counsel, some “error” is inevitable.
Either courts will grant a new trial based on the
occasional intentional mistake, or courts will deny
relief after unintentional mistakes. Equity clearly
favors choosing the first option. Some party must
bear the risk of structural error, but defendants
should not bear all of it. Giving the benefit of the
doubt to the defendant does not mean that a guilty
man will go free; it simply means that the defendant
will have the opportunity to vindicate his
constitutional right to a fair trial. There are many
checks preventing the widespread use of “appellate
See Winston v. Boatwright, 649 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2011);
Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2009); Owens v.
United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2007); McGurk v.
Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1998); Littlejohn v. United
States, 73 A.3d 1034 (D.C. 2013); Montana v. Lamere, 112 P.3d
1005 (Mont. 2005).
6
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parachutes,” and the responsibility of the courts to
protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights
outweighs the risk that this practice may be used in
a small minority of cases.
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CONCLUSION
The crucial importance of safeguarding the
public’s trust in the justice system requires the legal
profession to take seriously its professional duties to
render effective assistance of counsel. This duty
could not be more important than when a
defendant’s liberty is at stake. For the foregoing
reasons, amici respectfully urge that the decision of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts be
reversed.
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Institutional Amici
The Monroe H. Freedman Institute for
the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra University’s
Maurice A. Deane School of Law serves as a research
center for the study of legal ethics. The Freedman
Institute sponsors programs and conferences for
scholarly inquiry and trains law students to take
responsibility for serving others. The Freedman
Institute seeks to focus the attention of law students,
scholars, judges, and practitioners on today’s most
significant issues for the legal profession.
The National Association for Public
Defense (NAPD) is an association of more than
14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel
throughout all U.S. states and territories, including
all staff providing legal representation through the
Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel
Services (CPCS) as well as assigned counsel in the
Commonwealth. NAPD members include attorneys,
investigators, social workers, administrators, and
other support staff who are responsible for executing
the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. NAPD’s members are advocates in jails, in
courtrooms, and in communities and are experts in
theoretical best practices as well as in the practical,
day-to-day delivery of services. Their collective
expertise represents state, county, and local systems
through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel
The affiliations of the various amici are for identification
purposes only, and the views expressed in this brief do not
necessarily reflect the views of any associated institutions.
1

2a
delivery mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and
appellate offices, and through a diversity of
traditional and holistic practice models. NAPD
provides webinar-based and other training to its
members on the importance of providing vigorous
defense advocacy in all phases of litigation, including
preservation of trial error to secure the most optimal
standard of review during any appellate or postconviction phase of a case.
Individual Amici
Aviva Abramovsky is the Kauffman
Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation and
Associate Dean for International Initiatives at
Syracuse University College of Law. Professor
Abramovsky teaches courses in insurance law,
commercial
transactions,
and
professional
responsibility. She has twice served on the American
Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary. She currently serves on the Editorial
Board of the National Ministry of Public
Prosecutorial Ethics Council Journal of Brazil.
Joshua P. Davis is the Director of the Center
for Law and Ethics, Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs, and a Professor of Law at the University of
San Francisco School of Law. He teaches in the areas
of legal ethics, antitrust, complex litigation, and
constitutional law. He previously served as the
reporter for the committee that drafted the
California Supreme Court rules on multijurisdictional practice and testified before the United
States Congress on federal pleading standards.
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Tigran W. Eldred is a Professor of Law at
the New England School of Law. His research
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legal practice.
Lawrence J. Fox is a partner at Schoeman
Updike & Kaufman LLP. He is also currently the
George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting
Lecturer of Law at Yale Law School, teaching ethics
and professional responsibility, and serves as the
supervising lawyer for the Ethics Bureau at Yale,
one of the law school’s student clinics. He was
formerly a lecturer in law at both Harvard Law
School and the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, and has authored many articles and books on
professional responsibility. He is the former Chair of
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